Recent Decisions: Insurance Companies--Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws--Conflict with the McCarran-Ferguson Act [\u3ci\u3eSecurities Exchange Commission v. National Securities, Inc.\u3c/i\u3e, 393 U.S. 453 (1969)] by L., S. A.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 4
1969
Recent Decisions: Insurance Companies--
Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws--
Conflict with the McCarran-Ferguson Act
[Securities Exchange Commission v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969)]
S. A. L.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
S. A. L., Recent Decisions: Insurance Companies--Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws--Conflict with the McCarran-Ferguson Act
[Securities Exchange Commission v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969)], 20 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 883 (1969)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol20/iss4/9
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
tected by the statute. However, the need for legislative reform does
not rest on the narrow issue of whether a guarantor is to be afforded
the benefits of mortgagors whose right of redemption has been
abused. Instead, the legislature should address itself to the elimina-
tion of the distinction between the guarantor and the surety. In this
way the unconditional guarantor, whose liability is no less than that
of the surety, might be assured that when courts consider his liabil-
ities and his rights, general principles of suretyship will not be ig-
nored.
J. N. G., JR.
INSURANCE COMPANIES - APPLICABILITY OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS - CONFLICT WITH
THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Securities Exchange Commission v. National
Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
Congress has given to the several states the power to regulate
insurance companies' and to the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), the power to regulate corporate acquisitions.2 The extent
of these powers, however, has been the subject of much litigation
that has emphasized the need for clarification by the High Court.
The recent case of SEC v. National Securities,3 involved the merger
of two insurance companies and saw the Supreme Court examine
the limitations of both these powers but fail to define either of them
in a manner which will reduce future litigation.
In March of 1963, the Securities Exchange Commission brought
suit in the Arizona federal district court to enjoin the merger of
IMcCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
McCarran Act]. The Act provides in pertinent part:
§ 2(a) The business of insurance ... shall be subject to the laws of the several
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance .... Id. § 1012.
2 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities
Act]; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
change Act].
3 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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National Life and Casualty Insurance Company4 with Producers
Life Insurance Company alleging violations5 of section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act" and rule lob-5.7  Although the SEC obtained a
temporary restraining order as to future violations of section
10(b) and rule lob-5, the district court did not enjoin the merger
which was subsequently approved.
The SEC amended its complaint and asked for damages and
other relief necessary to return 'the companies and their sharehold-
ers to their premerger status.8 The district court granted judgment
on the pleadings9 to National Securities, holding that the McCar-
ran Act prohibited federal intervention into the state-approved
merger, and that the relief requested was not available under the
Exchange Act.'0 The court of appeals affirmed" solely on the ba-
sis of the McCarran preclusion.
The Supreme Court reversed 2 the court of appeals and con-
4 This company was the subsidiary of National Securities, which owned two-thirds
of National Life's 1,018,574 outstanding shares.
5The SEC alleged that after National Securities had obtained control of Producers
Life by purchasing both the treasury stock and stock owned by Producers Life's direc-
tors, National Securities made false and misleading statements in their proxy solicita-
tions for approval of the consolidation. The false and misleading statements consisted
of, inter alia, a failure to disclose the full amount of National Securities liabilities, list-
ing of illusory assets, and unsound predictions of the consolidated company's earnings.
Brief for Petitioner at 4-6, SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964). Section 10(b) provides that "[ijt shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly .... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ...."
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to
in any way:
(a) [EImploy any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) [Mlake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) [E]ngage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
8 The SEC asked that this be accomplished by
[C]ompelling the defendants . .. to make an accounting of the extent to
which their actions... have resulted in damage to such stockholders, and the
extent to which the defendants have been unjustly enriched . .. and that, by
suitable decree .. . the respective equities ... be arranged and adjusted . ..
[with] subordination of the stock interests and other equities of National
Securities in National Producers .... SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 252 F. Supp.
623, 624 (D. Ariz. 1966).
9 Id. at 623.
10 Id. at 626.
"L 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cit. 1967).
12 joining Justice Marshall in the majority were Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas, Fortas, Brennan, and White.
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strued the McCarran Act term "business of insurance" to include
only the insurer-policyholder relationship.' 3  Consequently, Na-
tional Securities' efforts to acquire control of Producers Life were
subject to the same degree of federal scrutiny as that surrounding
any corporate acquisition. The majority, however, by including
interpretations of sections of the Exchange Act provoked critical
dissents from Justices Harlan and Stewart. 4
The Supreme Court's holding that the McCarran Act did not
give blanket immunity from federal regulation to all corporate ac-
tivities of insurance companies should have been foreseeable.15
The Court had previously denied certiorari where a circuit court,
upholding the conviction of an insurance company for using the
mails in an attempt to defraud, had rejected the defendant's con-
tention that federal prosecution was precluded by the McCarran
Act.16  More 'recently, the Supreme Court had also implied 7 that
the McCarran Act did not exempt insurance companies from reg-
istering variable annuity contracts that were deemed to be "securi-
ties" for the purpose of the Securities Act.'
The McCarran Act protects "the business of insurance" from
federal regulation which would "invalidate, impair, or supersede"
any such regulation by the states.' Since Arizona had undertaken
the regulation of insurance company mergers;2 ° the SEC :had to es-
Is 393 U.S. at 459.
14Although Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred with the majority on the Mc-
Carran Act question, they did not feel the Court was justified in using this case as a
vehicle to examine the elusive provisions of the securities laws which, they argued, were
not properly before the Court for decision. Id. at 470.
Justice Black dissented, believing the court of appeals had correctly analyzed the
problem. Black's dissent is curious in light of his previous concurrence with the ma-
jority in similar cases rejecting the McCarran Act preclusion argument. See note 17
infra & accoiap anying text.
'
5 See 26 MDZ. L. REV. 375 (1966).
16United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
943 (1952). See also United States v. Meade, 179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
17See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1958). One author noted that "[wjhatever else the
case of the SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company decided, it settled the
question ... that federal agencies could take a hand in the regulation of insurance."
Mearns, The Commission, The Variable Annuity, and The Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45
VA. L. REV. 831 (1959).
18 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
19 Id. § 1012 (1964).
2 0Az. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 20-731 (1956). Seealso id. § 20-441 to -447, which
deal generally with deceit and fraud in the insurance business. In 1966, almost a year
after the merger of National Life and Producers Life, these statutes were amended to
specifically regulate proxy solicitation. Id. § 20-143 (Supp. 1969).
Although the SEC contended that the governing Arizona statutes did not empower
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tablish its jurisdiction upon one of two theories: that the SEC ac-
tion supplemented, rather than "invalidated, impaired, or super-
seded" the Arizona regulation; or that the activities of National
Securities were not the "business of insurance." The majority
chose the latter reasoning, and, after carefully examining the his-
torical background of the McCarran Act,2 ' concluded that the reg-
ulation of insurance mergers was not the "business of insurance."
Although there is certainly support for this premise,22 and al-
though the majority's rationale that state regulation of "[t~he rela-
tionship between the insurance company and the policy holder"23
alone is within the McCarran Act's protection is convincing, the ma-
jority diminished the effectiveness of the business of insurance test
by adding that "[s]tatutes aimed at protecting or regulating this re-
lationship, directly or indirectly, are laws regulating the "business
of insurance.' "
This qualification of the business of insurance test may have
created more problems than it solved. The majority noted that
state statutes regulating the licensing, selling, advertising, enforce-
ment, and reliability of insurance policies are aimed directly at the
core of the business of insurance.25 From the insured's standpoint,
assurance that his policy is reliable is his foremost concern. This
reliability is directly dependent on the financial soundness of his
insurer. It should follow then that the Arizona statute 6 which
the state insurance director to regulate disclosure in the proxy solicitations, the Court did
not find this point relevant. 393 U.S. at 457.
21 See id. at 458-59. The immunity from federal regulation enjoyed by insurance
companies evolved from the holding in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (9 Wall.) 168 (1868),
that insurance policies were not articles of commerce and thus not susceptible to federal
regulation under the commerce clause. However, 76 years later, in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), a case involving suit under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), the Court reversed its position, holding
that the issuance of insurance policies across state lines was commerce and subject to
federal regulation. No one doubted that insurance companies were not protected from
interstate monopolistic practices, but to insure that the states retained "the continuing
power.. to tax and regulate the business of insurance," Congress quickly passed the
McCarran Act. FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 299 (1959).
2 2 See note 21 supra. Historical support stems from the fact that, since before and
after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944), insurance company securities had been subject to federal regula-
tion under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and since the purpose of the McCar-
ran Act was merely to correct any misunderstandings that South-Eastern might have
created, the McCarran Act did not exempt from regulation the securities end of the
business. Brief for Petitioner at 17-22, SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
23 393 U.S. at 460.
24 Id. (emphasis added).
25 Id.
2 6 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-731 (1956). See note 20 supra.
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regulates insurance company mergers - an undertaking that may
affect the ratio of assets to contingent liabilities - would at least
indirectly regulate the business of insurance. Therefore, such a
state statute could not be superseded by federal law. But this was
not the Court's holding. 7  Presumably, the Court might have
avoided a potential ambiguity by creating a better definition for
the term "business of insurance." On the other hand, they could
have completely avoided the difficult task of defining this ambig-
uous statutory term by using the alternative approach, that SEC
regulation would merely supplement, rather -than "invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede" the state's action. The SEC urged such a solu-
tion,2 and the majority acknowledged that this approach had
merit.29
Although the supplemental approach could have served as an
acceptable basis -for the decision in National Securities, it would
have offered little guidance to a court faced with a federal statute
that was in direct conflict with a state insurance statute.30 The
majority may have foreseen this problem,31 and, consequently, felt
compelled to try to establish the scope of the McCarran Act's pro-
tection rather than rely upon what may have been a mere stopgap
solution.
Although the petition for certiorari and the petitioner's brief
were limited to the issue of whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act
precluded suit under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act,
the majority continued to probe many of the controversial proce-
27 While recognizing that the Arizona statute regulating insurance mergers related
to the business of insurance, the Court nonetheless did not feel that federaf regulation
was precluded. The majority explained that the Court was concerned with the regula-
tion of the proxy statements preceeding the merger, rather than the. mechanics of the
merger itself. It is arguable, however, that this distinction does not justify their posi-
tion since proxy solicitations are an integral part of any merger and are specifically
regulated under the Arizona statute. AR.sz REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-731 (1956).
2P The SEC argued:
[S]ection 10 (b) . . does not conflict with the Arizona insurance law, but is -
supplementary and collateral to it.- The Commission's suit in no way sought
to alter ... the requirements that State law imposes upon insurance com-
panies ... Surely this would not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" State
insurance regulation ,ithin the meaning of Section 2(b) of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act .... Brief for Petitioner at 25, SEC v. National Sec., Inc, 393
U.S. 453 (1969).
29 "It is clear that any 'impairment' in this case is a most indirect one. The Federal
Government is attempting to protect security holders .... Arizona ... is attempting
to protect the interests of the policy holders .... In these circumstances, we simply
cannot see the conflict" 393 U.S. at 463.
20 One example would be a state law that granted insurance companies immunity
from paying federal income tax.
'31 Cf. Maryland Cas. Co., v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
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dural aspects of the Exchange Act which had arisen in National
Securities. The SEC had attacked the alleged misrepresentations
and nondisclosures involved in the proxy solicitations32 by Na-
tional Securities under section 10(b) 33 of the Exchange Act and
rule lob-5. 4
Two sections of the Exchange Act are applicable to fraud in
proxy solicitation: section 10(b) which is the general antifraud
provision, and section 14(a) which is specifically aimed at fraud
in proxy material.35 Prosecution under the apparently more appli-
cable section 14(a) was foreclosed because the insurance compa-
ies' securities 'had not been registered on a national securities ex-
change. 6 But, the Court felt the need to clarify the problems of
propriety and procedure involved in a suit under these sections.
The majority quickly dismissed the respondent's contention that a
merger is not a purchase or sale within the meaning of section
10(b) .I The Court noted that, although the SEC had excluded
certain types of mergers3" as not involving a purchase or sale for
the purpose of section 5 of the Securities Act,3" the Commission
had continually asserted that this rule did not apply to section
10(b).4°  The lower courts had accepted this view,41 and the ma-
jority affirmed that those who - 'purchase' shares in the new com-
pany by exchanging them for their old stock"42 had completed a
purchase for the purpose of section 10(b). The more controver-
sial question concerning the necessity of being a purchaser or
32 See note 5 supra.
33 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964).
34 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
35 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1964).
36 Registration on a national securities exchange was a prerequisite to jurisdiction
under section 14 (a) prior to July 1, 1964. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1964). The Ex-
change Act, however, was amended in 1964 to bring unlisted securities within its juris-
diction, but insurance companies were again exempted if the state in which the com-
pany was located regulated the companies in the manner prescribed by the new amend-
ment. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1964). Arizona immediately assumed the degree
of regulation specified by the 1964 amendments. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 20-143
(Supp. 1969).
37 Section 10(b) reads in part: "It shall be unlawful .... in connection with the
purchase or sale of any securities ..." 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964).
38 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1969).
89 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964).
40 SECSecurities Act Release No. 3965 (Sept. 15, 1958).
41 See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967). But see National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 134 F.2d
689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943).
42 393 U.S. at 469.
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
seller 43 for a private action under section 10(b) 44 was not present
in National Securities and, notwithstanding criticism by the dis-
senters,45 the majority avoided this question.
In time, it may appear that the majority also should have
avoided an attempt to resolve the issue of when a section 10(b)
action is appropriate. National Securities had contended that as
long as their -alleged misrepresentations were in connection with
a proxy solicitation the Commission's only jurisdiction was under
section 14(a) and since National Securities was also exempted
from the scope of this section,46 they could not be attacked at all.
Their contention is not without merit;4' but, assuming, arguendo,
that the majority was correct in allowing suit under section 10(b),
it does not necessarily follow, as the majority implied,4 that sec-
tions 10(b) and 14(a) completely overlap. It seems that the ma-
jority would not only allow redress of a proxy misrepresentation
under section 10(b) where attack under section 14(s) was barred,
but also where suit under this section was permissible. The lower
courts are still struggling to determine the standards for material-
ity, scienter, reliance, causation, and privity for a private action 9
under sections 14(a) and 10(b). The majority's ":take-your-pick"
philosophy only compounds the problem -by making it necessary to
43 This problem concerns whether a plaintiff has standing for an action under sec-
tion 10(b) when he has neither sold nor purchased a security. This situation may be
illustrated by a plaintiff-stockholder who feels he has been harmed because the directors
breached their fiduciary duty by purchasing shares of another company at an inflated
price. See note 59 infra & accompanying text.
4 4 Although section 10(b) does not specifically grant a private right of action, lower
courts have consistently allowed private suits under section 10(b). See, e.g., Errion v.
Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956). The Supreme Court has never expressly af-
firmed this right. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Court would reverse this
judicial trend.
45justices Harlan and Stewart considered discussion of this question relevant be-
cause "both private and public actions arise under the same Rule, and the legal prob-
lems ... are closely related." 393 U.S. at 471 n.4 (concurring opinion).
4 6 See note 36 supra.
4 7See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SECUUTiES REGuLATION 1787-91 (1961); Cohen, "Truth
in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L REv. 1340 n.89 (1966).
48 "But the existence or non-existence of regulation under § 14 would not effect
the scope of § 10(b) .... [O]verlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate." 393 U.S.
at 468.
4 9 Concerning the standards required for prosecution under section 10(b), see 3 L.
Loss, supra note 47, at 1430-44. See also Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Pri-
vate Suit Under SEC Antifraud Rule lOb-5, 64 MIc I. REV. 1670 (1965); Note,
Civil Liability Under Section IlOB and Rule IOB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doc-
trine of Privity, 74 YALE UJ. 658 (1965). Concerning the standard for prosecution
under section 14(a), see Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of
J. . Case v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1150 (1965).
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re-evaluate in view of this overlap the validity of the case law that
has established different standards for the two sections.50
In its amended complaint, the SEC asked for an injunction and
all other "measures which are necessary to rectify and correct the
consequences of the wrongful and unlawful conduct ....- 51
When the district court dismissed the SEC's complaint, they held,
inter alia, that the requested remedies would not be permitted
under section 21(e) of the Exchange Act.52 This section permits
only injunctive relief, and the courts have not settled the extent to
which ancillary relief for restitution, recission, and damages may
be granted.53 On remand, the district court will again have to face
this problem with relatively little guidance from the High Court.,4
Insurance companies may be more upset by the tone of Na-
tional Securities than by its holding that the purchase and sale of
their own securities are subject to federal regulation. That is, the
majority opinion seems to reflect skepticism about the immunity
from federal regulation presently enjoyed by insurance companies
-in their corporate activities that clearly do not directly involve a
purchase or sale of a security. As the law stands now, insurance
companies located in states that comply with the 1964 amend-
ments55 to the Exchange Act are free from regulation of proxy so-
licitations unless these proxies are in connection with a purchase or
sale of a security. Although the majority did in fact hold that the
merger in National Securities was a purchase and sale, they implied
that the most salutary test of a cause of action under section 10(b)
and rule lob-5 is whether the "[a]lleged conduct is the type of
fraudulent behavior which was meant to be forbidden by the stat-
ute and the rule."5" Thus, insurance companies may soon face the
50 E.g., Globus v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Richland v.
Grandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
51252 F. Supp. 623, 624 (D. Ariz. 1966). See note 8 supra.
52 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(e) (1964).
53 See Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule 1Ob-5,
79 HARv. L. REv. 656 (1966). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
approved the SEC's request for rescission and restitution in a suit against individual de-
fendants for violation of section 10(b). See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968). Also, the Supreme Court has allowed ancillary relief in a private
action under section 14(a). See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
54 The majority's opinion as to available remedies was inconsistent. The Court
first stated that it would express no opinion on the construction of section 21(e); but,
the Court saw no reason for refusing the relief requested by the SEC. The opinion
added that "the trial court may order a return to the status quo ante if it finds that
course of action desirable, necessary and otherwise lawful." 393 U.S. at 464.
55 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1964). See note 36 supra.
56 393 U.S. at 467.
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same -federal scrutiny as other corporations for fraudulent conduct
with respect to proxy solicitation despite their apparent legislative
immunity.57
Moreover, noninsurance companies subject to regulation un-
der -the Exchange Act should take notice of the majority opinion in
National Securities. The Court's approval of a broad overlap be-
tween sections 10(b) and 14(a) may open the way for successful
SEC prosecution for proxy violations by forcing a closer correlation
of fhe different levels of materiality, scienter, reliance, causation,
and privity that presently must be established for each section.58
Although most courts have held that the scope of section 10(b)
does not give rise to an action for breach of a corporation's fidu-
ciary duties, 9 the majority's desire to forge section 10(b) into a
broad antifraud provision 0 may negate these precedents. National
Securities, despite its lack of precision, may yet supply the judicial
approval to more far reaching controls sought by the SEC to pro-
tect the shareholder in an increasingly complex way of corporate
life.61
S. A. L.
57 In fact, the Commission argued that the exemptions granted to insurance com-
panies in the 1964 amendments to the Exchange Act were limited only to the require-
ment of "periodic reports, proxies and insider-trading ... and do not... affect... the
antifraud provision of Section 10(b) ...." Brief for Petitioner at 29, SEC v. National
Sec, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
58 This overlap is significant because the elements of the two claims may not be
identical. That is, the causation requirement may be less strict in rule 10b-5 cases than
in section 14 (a) cases; on the other hand, the requirement of scienter may be more
demanding in rule lOb-5 cases. Coffey, Procedural Issues in Borak Cases, 2 REV. SEC.
REG. 969, 971 (1969). See note 50 supra.
59 See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). But see Entel v. Allen,
270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6 0 See 393 U.S. at 466; notes 43 & 59 supra.
61 See Cohen, The Development of Rule lOb-5, 23 Bus. LAwYER 593, 597-98
(1968), where Mr. Cohen, who was SEC chairman from 1964 to 1968, observed:
[Ojur increasingly sophisticated and complex corporate life has not lessened
the need for continual . .. raising of the standards of those who manage
other people's money. Rule lob-5 is making an important contribution to-
wards the attainment of that goal. We, at the Commission, with the aid and
comfort from the courts, will continue to provide such assistance....
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